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Abstract
Differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DPSGD) is a variation of stochas-
tic gradient descent based on the Differential Privacy (DP) paradigm which can
mitigate privacy threats arising from the presence of sensitive information in train-
ing data. One major drawback of training deep neural networks with DPSGD
is a reduction in the model’s accuracy. In this paper, we propose an alternative
method for preserving data privacy based on introducing noise through learnable
probability distributions, which leads to a significant improvement in the utility
of the resulting private models. We also demonstrate that normalization layers
have a large beneficial impact on the performance of deep neural networks with
noisy parameters. In particular, we show that contrary to general belief, a large
amount of random noise can be added to the weights of neural networks without
harming the performance, once the networks are augmented with normalization
layers. We hypothesize that this robustness is a consequence of the scale invariance
property of normalization operators. Building on these observations, we propose
a new algorithmic technique for training deep neural networks under very low
privacy budgets by sampling weights from Gaussian distributions and utilizing
batch or layer normalization techniques to prevent performance degradation. Our
method outperforms previous approaches, including DPSGD, by a substantial
margin on a comprehensive set of experiments on Computer Vision and Natural
Language Processing tasks. In particular, we obtain a 20% accuracy improvement
over DPSGD on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets with DP-privacy budgets of
ε = 0.05 and ε = 2.0, respectively. Our implementation is available online:
https://github.com/uds-lsv/SIDP.
1 Introduction
Training deep neural networks typically requires large and representative data collections to achieve
high performance. However, some of these datasets contain sensitive information such as medical
records of patients or private financial data. This calls for the development of dedicated private
training methods in order to address privacy concerns (see e. g. [30]).
Differential privacy (DP) [8] provides a concrete cryptography-inspired notion of privacy. In practice,
DP algorithms are obtained from non-private algorithms by means of appropriate randomization [10].
Differential privacy has been integrated into deep learning in [25, 1] to tackle privacy issues. The
proposed method in [1] is based on clipping gradients and adding random noise to them in each
iteration of stochastic gradient descent (SGD). This differentially private SGD (DPSGD) technique,
along with a moments accountant method for tracing the privacy loss, has enabled training deep
neural networks under a modest privacy budget at the cost of a manageable reduction in the model’s
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test accuracy. However, for low privacy budgets (i. e. a small ε, see Section 4), which corresponds to
a large privacy guarantee, this accuracy drops significantly under DPSGD.
As an alternative, we propose adding calibrated noise to the parameters of the model by sampling
the weights from learnable probability distributions. This is similar to introducing uncertainty in the
weights of the network by sampling from a posterior distribution [4]. However, unlike the Bayesian
approach where the amount of perturbation in each weight is learned, in a privacy-preserving training,
the minimum acceptable variance is determined by the privacy budget. In this work, we show that
introducing noise as proposed leads to a major improvement in the utility of privately trained models.
We also investigate the impact of batch normalization [12] and layer normalization [3] on the
performance of training under privacy constraints. One important property of normalization methods
is the invariance of the model with respect to weight matrix re-scaling [3]. We argue that this
invariance suggests robustness against noise injection and confirm this hypothesis empirically.
Motivated by these observations, we propose a differentially private training method that relies on
representing weights by learnable Gaussian distributions and exploiting the scale-invariance property
of normalization layers. We term this method scale invariant DPSGD (SI-DPSGD). We compare our
proposal with the current state-of-the-art methods by conducting a series of experiments on Computer
Vision and Natural Language Processing tasks. In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• Our primary contribution is a methodology for training neural networks under very low
privacy budgets (ε < 0.5) while preserving utility. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that shows how to efficiently train very deep neural networks, such as ResNet and
VGG models, with strong privacy constraints.
• We demonstrate that normalization layers have a substantial impact on the performance of
models with noisy parameters and should be considered essential ingredients for a robust
differentially private training.
• We propose an efficient method for using batch normalization layers without incurring more
privacy loss in the training procedure. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to
apply a DP mechanism in the presence of batch normalization.
• We establish new accuracy records for differentially private trained deep networks on the
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
2 Related Work
Noisy Networks. There is a large volume of research on investigating the effects of noise injection
into the weights of neural networks during training as well as inference. Most of these works have
focused on injecting noise during training to improve the convergence and generalization of models
[13]. A complete survey on this direction of research is exhaustive and we refer the reader to [27]
for reference. Noisy networks also have been studied from a Bayesian point of view. In particular,
[4] has introduced a backpropagation-compatible algorithm for learning a probability distribution
on the weights of the network, called Bayes by Backprop. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
systematic study of the role of normalization layers in noisy networks.
Differential privacy. Many methods have been developed to preserve privacy in machine learning
models. [25] proposed a distributed multiparty learning mechanism for a network without sharing
input datasets, however, the obtained privacy guarantee was very loose. [1] developed an efficient
differentially private SGD for training networks with a large number of parameters. Some recent
works report improvements in the utility of DPSGD. A method for adding less noise to the weights
of neural networks is proposed in [23] by using adaptive clipping of the gradients. [19] shows that
learning with DPSGD requires optimization of the model architectures and initializations. Perturbing
objective function as an alternative way to protect privacy has been suggested in [22]. We refer an
interested reader to [31] for a more comprehensive list of works in this area.
3 Noise and normalization
In this section, we investigate how random Gaussian noise affects a network’s performance in
the presence of normalization layers. More specifically, we sample the weights from a Gaussian
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distribution N (µ, σ2) with learnable mean parameters µ and constant variance σ2. Backpropagation
is performed by making use of the standard reparametrization trick [24]. This way of training is
very similar to variational Bayesian learning of neural networks [4], where weights are represented
by probability distributions rather than having a fixed value. Unlike the Bayesian approach though,
where the goal is learning the true posterior distribution of the weights given the training data, here
the noise is introduced via an ad-hoc distribution function.
Both batch and layer normalization ensures zero mean and unit variance in the output of a layer but
using different statistics. More precisely, if we denote the weighted summed inputs to the l-th layer
by zl = wT al−1 where al−1 is the activation in layer l − 1 and w is the weight matrix, then the
normalization operators rescale and shift z according to:
z˜li =
γi√
σl,2i + 
(zli − µli) + βi (1)
where γi ∈ R and βi ∈ R are learnable parameters and σli and µli are estimated as follows for batch
normalization:
µBN, li = E
x∼p(x)
[zli], σ
BN,l,2
i = E
x∼p(x)
[(zli − µli)2], (2)
and the corresponding relations for layer normalization are given by:
µLN, l =
1
n
n∑
i=1
zli, σ
LN,l =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(zli − µli)2, (3)
where n is the number of hidden units in the layer.
In this work, we focus on the scale invariance property of normalization methods. It is well known
that both batch and layer normalization are invariant under scaling of the weight matrix θ → λθ
with arbitrary λ > 0 [3]. In order to demonstrate the effect of this symmetry, consider a deep neural
network f(θ∗, .) which characterizes the relationship from input to output with trained parameters
θ∗. The training procedure always leaves some small uncertainty of order δ  1 on the final values
of weights. Consequently, the performance of the model with parameters θ∗ and θ∗ +O(δ) will be
essentially identical. For example, we may change the number of iterations or the learning rate very
slightly without harming the performance of the network.
We can make f(θ∗, .) invariant with respect to scaling of the weight matrix by augmenting it
with batch/layer normalization operators after each learnable layer, fBN/LN(θ∗, .). The re-scaling
invariance implies that if the weight uncertainty in the original network is of order O(δ) then in the
augmented network it can be of orderO(λδ) without affecting the overall performance. This suggests
that neural networks with batch/layer normalization layers should be robust against the noise in their
weights. In the rest of this section, we empirically confirm this hypothesis by injecting noise into the
weights of augmented networks during the training and testing procedure.
To test our hypothesis, we train standard fully-connected as well as convolutional neural networks
with noisy weights on MNIST [17] and CIFAR-10 [15]. These datasets are considered benchmark
datasets in recent work for the examination of deep learning models with differential privacy [1].
In particular, we investigate thoroughly LeNet-300-100 and LeNet-5 [16] and variants of ResNet
[11] and VGG [26] models. The structure of the models is outlined in Table 1 of the supplementary
material. For each architecture, we construct a normalized augmented version by adding batch or
layer normalization after each trainable layer. All models are implemented in PyTorch [21] and
trained with the Adam optimizer [14].
Table 1 shows the accuracy of the augmented models on the MNIST test dataset, averaged over
ten runs against unnormalized baselines. The BN/LN prefixes in this table denote models that are
obtained by adding batch normalization or layer normalization layers to the original architectures,
respectively. It is evident from this experiment that all augmented models are tolerant to noise while
the baselines are not. Indeed, their accuracy does not change at all for a large range of noise levels
within the statistical error as promised by the scale invariance property of the networks. On the other
hand, the baseline models are very sensitive to small weight perturbations. Notably, disturbing the
weights of the baseline models by a small noise of order σ = 0.3 results in non-converging training.
Experiments on CIFAR-10 with ResNet and VGG networks show similar trends, see Table 2. As
opposed to LeNet models, the original ResNet and VGG networks already contain BN layers after all
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Table 1: Results of MNIST test-set accuracy (%± standard error) in the presence of injected noise to
the weights for different models. The accuracy of models with normalization layers doesn’t change
within the standard deviations. In contrast, baseline models are much more sensitive to the noise, and
they don’t converge if the level of noise exceeds a threshold.
Model
Noise Level (σ)
0 0.01 0.1 1 2
LeNet-300-100 98.20±0.07 97.70±0.30 96.98±0.12 No-convergence No-convergence
BN-LeNet-300-100 98.20±0.10 98.10±0.10 98.07±0.11 98.07±0.12 98.13±0.08
LN-LeNet-300-100 98.04±0.16 98.00±0.10 98.08±0.14 98.04±0.09 98.03±0.17
LeNet-5 99.20±0.02 98.94±0.07 98.40±0.03 No-convergence No-convergence
BN-LeNet-5 99.20±0.08 99.21±0.05 99.18±0.06 99.24±0.04 99.25±0.07
LN-LeNet-5 99.16±0.08 99.14±0.06 99.13±0.07 99.21±0.05 99.19±0.07
Table 2: CIFAR-10 test-set percentage accuracy (%± standard error) with noisy weights for a variety
of models. We see the same pattern as in MNIST dataset where models augmented with batch
normalization are very robust against noise.
Model
Noise Level (σ)
0 0.01 0.1 1 2
ResNet-18 93.50±0.04 89.05±0.60 89.41±0.67 86.76±1.30 87.83±0.87
ResNet-18-mod 93.60±0.18 88.65±1.22 88.16±1.22 85.46±1.21 83.95±2.51
BN-ResNet-18 93.55±0.04 93.59±0.18 93.46±0.24 92.72±0.26 92.10±0.28
VGG-16 91.21±0.16 88.89±0.56 84.59±6.11 63.12±8.21 No-convergence
VGG-16-mod 91.18±0.20 88.87±0.59 82.58±6.91 22.58±5.0 No-convergence
BN-VGG-16 91.75±0.22 91.69±0.20 91.56±0.24 90.95±0.25 90.35±0.14
except the last trainable layer. This leads to some degree of protection against noise as demonstrated
in Table 2. For example, the accuracy of ResNet-18 with a noise level of 1 reduces only to 87%
instead of to random prediction. To illustrate the role of normalization layers further, we also present
results on ResNet-18-mod and VGG-16-mod which are obtained by removing the last normalization
layer from the original architectures. As it is shown in the Table 2 these models are more vulnerable
to the added noise.
Next, we extended our experiments to a more complex task, viz. natural language text classification,
where we observe a similar effect. For this, we trained a BiLSTM model with one linear/dense layer
(DL) with/without layer normalization (LN) on the AG News Corpus 1, a popular text classification
dataset with 4 categories of news: World, Sports, Business and Sci/Tech. We trained the models with
different noise levels σ for 25 epochs. We find that the higher the noise level, the more number of
epochs are needed to maintain the accuracy of the baseline model. Our results on the language data
in Table 3 suggest that layer normalization makes the BiLSTM model robust to noise with minimal
drops in accuracy (1− 7%).
It is worth mentioning that achieving the same accuracy in the presence of noise does not come
for free as it affects the training time: the larger the noise, the slower the training. For example,
increasing the noise level from 1 to 10 slows down training by a factor of order 7 for LeNet and
ResNet models. More details on this can be found in supplementary material Section 2.
Another way to introduce noise to the weights is to directly make the SGD updates noisy. We
confirmed empirically that normalization layers also improve the robustness of this training method
against large noise injection. However, since this way of adding noise is equivalent to perturbing
the gradients of the network, it results in inferior performance compared to sampling weights from
learnable distributions. We will come back to this point in Section 5 where we compare our method
directly with DPSGD.
1http://groups.di.unipi.it/~gulli/AG_corpus_of_news_articles.html
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Table 3: AG News Corpus test accuracy with noisy weights for a variety of models. We see the
same pattern as the vision dataset where models augmented with layer normalization are very robust
against noise.
Model
Noise Level (σ)
0 0.01 0.1 1 2
BiLSTM-DL 89.34% 89.57% 89.01% 66.32% 24.76%
LN-BiLSTM-DL 89.34% 88.87% 88.62% 85.74% 82.41%
4 Differential privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a systematic approach to quantifying privacy guarantee while querying a
dataset. We proceed by briefly recalling some preliminaries on differential privacy and then propose
our approach for training deep neural networks in a differentially private way.
Let us denote the domain of data points by χ. We call two datasets D1, D2 ∈ χ neighboring if they
differ exactly in a single data point , d(D1, D2) = 1, where d(., .) is the Hamming distance.
Definition 4.1. (Differential Privacy [9]). A randomized algorithmM : χ → R with domain χ
and range R is (ε, δ) differential private if for all measurable sets S ∈ R and for all neighboring
datasets D1 and D2, it holds that
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp (ε) Pr[M(D2) ∈ S] + δ. (4)
A standard approach for achieving differential privacy is to add some random noise r to the output of
queries, q(D) + r, and to tune the noise r by the sensitivity of the query. Lp sensitivity is defined
as the maximum change in the outcome of a query for two neighboring datasets and measures the
maximum influence that a single data point can have on the result of the query:
Sp = max
d(D1,D2)=1
‖q(D2)− q(D1)‖p. (5)
Differential privacy has been integrated into deep learning in [25] and subsequently in [1] for the
setting where an adversary has access to the network architecture and learned weights, f(θ∗, .). In
particular, [1] preserves privacy by adding noise to the SGD updates, leading to differentially private
SGD (DPSGD). More precisely, to make the learning private, the authors of [1] update the weights at
each iteration of training as follows:
θt+1 ← θt − η gt + η
L
r, (6)
where gt is the averaged gradient, η is the learning rate and r is sampled according to the Gaussian
distribution N (0, σ2). To control the influence of training samples on the parameters, the gradients
are clipped by the L2-norm:
pi(gi) = gi .min(1, C/‖gi‖2), (7)
where gi is the gradient corresponding to the i-th sample and C is the clipping factor. It has been
shown in [1] that each step of DPSGD is (ε, δ)-differential private once we tune the noise σ = C z as
z =
√
2 ln 1.25δ
ε .
4.1 SI-DPSGD
Here we develop a novel approach for training deep neural networks while preserving data privacy,
which deviates from DPSGD by making a major change in the representation of weights. Indeed, we
sample the weights from a normal distribution with learnable mean parameters µt and fixed variance
σ2 given by the desired privacy budget. Furthermore, we utilize the normalization layers to keep
the performance of the models intact. We term this method scale invariant differentially private
SGD (SI-DPSGD). Algorithm 1 outlines the training steps of SI-DPSGD in reaching a differentially
private model for networks without batch normalization. We explain the detail of this algorithm in
the following.
The first step is to initialize the mean parameters and weights randomly. Then, at each iteration, we
bound the influence of each individual sample on the gradients. To do so, we follow the same strategy
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Algorithm 1: SCALE INVARIANT DPSGD (WITH LAYER NORMALIZATION)
Input: dataset D = {(x1, y1), · · · } of size N , loss function L(θ, .), learning rate ηt,
noise multiplier z, sample size L, gradient norm bound C and T iterations.
• Initialize mean parameters µ0 randomly.
• Set weights as θ0 = µ0.
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
• Take a random sample with size L and selection probability LN .• Compute gradient
gt(xi)← ∇µtL(θt(µt), xi).• Clip gradient
gt(xi)← gt(xi) . min(1, C/‖gt(xi)‖2)
• Compute averaged gradient
gt ← 1L
∑
i gt(xi)• Update mean parameters
µt+1 ← µt − ηt gt
• Add noise
θt+1 = µt+1 +
ηt
LN (0, C2z2)
end for
Return θT ∼ N (µT , η
2
T
L2C
2z2).
as in DPSGD [1], i. e., we clip the gradients in l2 norm using a clipping threshold C as in Eq 7. We
then update the mean parameters µt using SGD with truncated gradients. Finally, to preserve privacy,
we sample the weights from the normal distribution N (µt+1, η
2
t
L2C
2z2), with updated mean values
and its variance corresponding to the privacy budget for each iteration. These sampled weights, in
turn, will be used in the next forward and backward pass to compute the loss and gradients. Therefore
the update rule of DPSGD, Eq 6, is replaced with the following set of equations:
µt+1 ← µt − η gt, (8)
θt+1 ← µt+1 + η
L
r. (9)
The difference between the update equations of DPSGD and SI-DPSGD becomes especially apparent
as the weights evolve during training. To illustrate this point more tangibly, let us compare a few
iterations of Eq 6 with Eqs 8 and 9. Starting from the initial point µ0 = θ0, after applying two
iterations of gradient descent, DPSGD leads to the following expression for the updated weights:
θ2 = θ0 − η g0 − η g1 + 2 η
L
N (0, σ2), (10)
while for SI-DPSGD we arrive at:
µ2 = θ0 − η g0 − η g1, (11)
θ2 = µ2 +
η
L
r = θ0 − η g0 − η g1 + η
L
N (0, σ2), (12)
where for simplicity, we have assumed that the gradients have the same distributions in both cases.
Comparing Eq 10 with Eq 12, we observe that DPSGD and SI-DPSGD are mathematically different
and lead to different distributions for the weights. Furthermore, SI-DPSGD results in a smaller
variance in the weights. The deviation between the two methods becomes progressively greater with
more iterations. Roughly speaking, we keep the evolution path of the trainable parameters (µt) intact
in SI-DPSGD, while in DPSGD, interference of subsequently injected noises leads to an inferior
gradient descent trajectory. Note that both approaches add the same amount of noise to the weights at
each iteration as dictated by the privacy budget and thus lead to the same (ε, δ)-DP mechanism as
shown in Lemma 4.1. The distinction between the two methods is also confirmed experimentally in
Section 5 by applying them to the same models without any normalization layers.
Now we turn our attention to the case of networks with batch normalization layers. In a non-private
setting, one usually keeps track of the running averages of mean and variance statistics (Eq. 2) during
the training procedure and reuses this collected information at test time. Since these running averages
are also a part of the model’s outputs, in a private training we have to add noise also to these statistics
at each iteration and distribute the privacy budgets among the weights and moving averages to make
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Algorithm 2: SCALE INVARIANT DPSGD (WITH BATCH NORMALIZATION)
Training Phase
Input: dataset D = {(x1, y1), · · · } of size N , a public dataset Xˆ = {xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆM},
loss function L(θ, .), learning rate ηt, noise multiplier z, sample size L, gradient norm
bound C and T iterations.
• Initialize mean parameters µ0 randomly.
• Set weights as θ0 = µ0.
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
• Take a random sample, X ∼ D, with size L and selection probability LN .• Concatenate the public data to each lot
X ← X ∪ Xˆ
• Compute lost for the first L elements
L(θt, xi) = L(θt, X)[i]
• Compute gradient
gt(xi)← ∇µtL(θt(µt), xi).• Clip gradient
gt(xi)← gt(xi) . min(1, C/‖gt(xi)‖2)
• Compute averaged gradient
gt ← 1L
∑
i gt(xi)• Update mean parameters:
µt+1 ← µt − ηt gt
• Sample weights
θt+1 ∼ N (µt+1, η
2
t
L2C
2z2)
end for
Return θT ∼ N (µT , η
2
T
L2C
2z2).
Test Phase
Input: test dataset Dtest = {(x1, y1), · · · } of size Ntest, the public dataset Xˆ =
{xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆM}, trained model f(θT , .).
• Initialize Y← ∅
for i = 0 to Ntest − 1 do
• Concatenate the public dataset to each data point xi
X ← xi ∪ Xˆ
• Compute the network output corresponding to the data point xi
yi = f(θT , X)[0]
•Append yi to the results
Y ← Y ∪ yi
end for
Return outputs of network Y .
the overall procedure differentially private. We have found empirically that if we tune the noise
according to the worst-case scenario, the performance of the model drops drastically. Therefore we
employ a more sophisticated approach to deal with batch normalization in a DP training setting as
shown in algorithm 2.
First of all, we do not track the running averages during the training phase and instead computed
fresh statistics accumulated from the current batch are used to normalize the neurons. But to be able
to deal with batch normalization at test time we concatenate a fixed amount of data points Xˆ with
size M taken from a public dataset, disjoint from the training data, to the input of the network, both
in the training and the test phase. These samples only contribute to the statistics and not to the cost
function directly. Therefore, in the training phase, the cost is computed via L(θt, X ∪ Xˆ)[: L], where
X is a batch of size L from the training data, and [: L] denotes the slice of first L elements. At test
time, when we iterate over the dataset, the same public data points Xˆ are also concatenated to each
test sample, x, and the output of network is computed as f(θT , x∪ Xˆ)[0]. This allows us to compute
the normalization statistics over a batch of size 1 +M without any reference to the training data.
Before we proceed to the experimental results, we show that each iteration of algorithms 1 (or the
batch normalization counterpart) is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Lemma 4.1. Each iteration of algorithm 1 is (ε, δ) differentially private for each δ > 0 with
ε =
√
2 ln 1.25δ
z
. (13)
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Proof. We consider two neighboring datasets D1, D2. Let us also denote the SI-DPSGD mechanism
asM(w,D), where D is the considered dataset and w represents some auxiliary (private and public)
parameters, such as the public dataset Xˆ in the case of batch-normalization, or mean parameters µt.
The privacy loss in each iteration is given by:
ln
Pr [M(w,D1) = θ]
Pr [M(w,D2) = θ] = ln
Pr
[
θ | µ(2) = µt − ηt g(1)t ,σ
]
Pr
[
θ | µ(1) = µt − ηt g(2)t ,σ
]
= ln
exp
[
−1
2σ2 (θ − µt + ηt g(1)t )2
]
exp
[
−1
2σ2 (θ − µt + ηt g(2)t )2
] ,
where gt is the averaged gradient and ηt is the learning rate. We note that the above loss is exactly what
we get from a Gaussian mechanism with sensitivity S2 ≡ ‖µ(2) − µ(1)‖ = ηt ‖g(2)t − g(1)t ‖ ≤ ηtL C
and so equation 13 follows from the standard result for Gaussian mechanisms [10].
It is important to note that the mean parameters µt are not protected by this mechanism and should
not be revealed to the adversary as we do not add noise to the gradients. Furthermore, since our
method is a variant of Gaussian mechanisms, we may utilize the well-developed moments accountant
[1] and its subsequent generalizations [29] to guarantee that the training process ensures (ε, δ)-DP.
5 Experiments
In this section, we report the results of applying our method and compare them with existing
differentially private mechanisms. The purpose of these experiments is three-fold: (1) we show
that, unlike DPSGD, training with SI-DPSGD incurs only negligible performance penalties; (2)
we indicate that both the algorithmic improvements and the introduced normalization contribute to
SI-DPSGD’s superior performance; and (3) we demonstrate that while prohibitive under DPSGD,
training very deep networks is feasible with SI-DPSGD.
All models, as well as DPSGD, have been implemented in PyTorch [20]. To track the privacy loss
over the whole training procedure, we employ the Rényi-DP technique [18]. We use the open-source
implementation of the Rényi DP accountant from the TensorFlow Privacy package [28] .
Table 4 depicts the accuracy of various models on the MNIST test set for ε ranging from high
to very low privacy budgets. In addition to [1], we have also included the TensorFlow Privacy
benchmark on MNIST and LATENT which is a local-privacy based mechanism proposed recently
in [2]. Additionally, we trained LeNet-5 with and without normalization layers with DPSGD and
SI-DPSGD. Since DPSGD is not directly applicable to batch normalization, we just show the results
of DPSGD with layer normalization. Also, for training the model augmented with batch normalization
using SI-DPSGD, we employed 30 images of KMNIST [6] as the public dataset.
As evident from Table 4, our method consistently outperforms other mechanisms for all finite values
of privacy loss. Remarkably, the performance of BN-LeNet-5 trained with SI-DPSGD is almost
identical for various privacy budgets and the largest gap between private and non-private models
is only about 0.6%. In particular, using SI-DPSGD along with batch normalization, we are able to
train the LeNet-5 model under an extremely low privacy budget of ε = 0.025 with 98.58% accuracy,
very close to the non-private performance 99.2%. Training with DPSGD results in a 50% reduction
in accuracy for the same model. We also note that SI-DPSGD outperforms DPSGD even without
applying any normalization layer as promised in Section 4.
Table 5 summarizes the results of DPSGD, LATENT, and SI-DPSGD on ResNet-18, VGG-16 and
Fast-CIFAR-ResNet. Fast-CIFAR-ResNet [7] is a small variant of ResNet which achieves 94% test
accuracy after 25 epochs, making it an appealing choice for our work. Although the common practice
in the literature is to start from a convolutional network pretrained on CIFAR-100, here we train our
models from scratch. For training models with SI-DPSGD, we use 30 images of CIFAR-100 as our
public dataset.
As Table 5 illustrates, SI-DPSGD results in better accuracies than DPSGD on TensorFlow tutorial
model. Furthermore, Fast-CIFAR-ResNet trained with SI-DPSGD outperforms both DPSGD and
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Table 4: Test accuracy of various differentially private training methods on MNIST with different
privacy loss and δ = 10−5. Our method (SI-DPSGD) results in negligible accuracy gaps between
non-private and private models with low privacy budgets.
DP Algorithm
privacy budget (ε)
∞ 7 3 1 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.025
DPSGD [1] 98.30% 96.90% 95.80% 93.10% 90.00% NA NA NA
DPSGD (tensorflow privacy ) 99.00% 97.16% 96.89% 95.00% 91.12% 84.10% 72.77% 29.40%
LATENT [5] 98.16% 97.10% 96.05% 97.10% 96.26% NA NA NA
DPSGD (LeNet-5) 99.20% 97.01% 96.34% 94.11% 91.10% 83.00% 78.96% 31.56%
DPSGD (LN-LeNet-5) 99.20% 97.35% 97.05% 96.68% 94.81% 87.45% 75.76% 49.53%
SI-DPSGD (LeNet-5) 99.20% 98.90% 98.90% 98.72% 99.10% 99.00% 98.84% 90.82%
SI-DPSGD (LN-LeNet-5) 99.20% 98.85% 98.30% 98.41% 98.56% 97.92% 97.54% 98.36%
SI-DPSGD (BN-LeNet-5) 99.20% 99.17% 99.17% 99.15% 99.18% 99.14% 99.12% 98.58%
Table 5: Results on CIFAR-10 test-set accuracy with δ = 10−5. Again SI-DPSGD makes training of
deep models feasible under low privacy budget and achieves state-of-the art records. Models with
SI-DPSGD are trained from scratch.
DP Algorithm
privacy budget (ε)
∞ 8 4 2 1 0.5 0.1 0.05
DPSGD (TF-tutorial) [1] 80.00% 73.0% 70.0% 67.0% NA NA NA NA
SI-DPSGD (TF-tutorial) 80.00% 78.10% 77.70% 76.00% 76.05% 74.20% 73.80% 74.05%
LATENT [5] 95.00% 91.80% 91.05% 91.95% 90.20% 91.47% NA NA
SI-DPSGD (ResNet-18) 93.50% 90.20% 90.16% 90.26% 90.09% 89.67% 84.88% 84.47%
SI-DPSGD (VGG-16) 91.21% 91.48% 90.96% 89.53% 90.01% 88.87% 85.90% 84.98%
SI-DPSGD (Fast-CIFAR-ResNet) 94.00% 93.85% 93.44% 93.38% 92.70% 92.08% 89.11% 87.41%
LATENT by achieving smaller accuracy gaps between non-private and private networks. In particular,
for a modest privacy budget of ε ∼ 2 the accuracy of the private model (93.38%) is very close to
the non-private baseline. It is only under low privacy budgets of ε ∼ 0.05 that we observe drops in
accuracy of around 6%. It should be noted that we do not include the results of DPSGD training
of ResNet and VGG in this table as it is not clear how to train such deep networks with batch
normalization layers using DPSGD.
Finally, Table 6 shows the result of our experiment on text classification. We compare the test
accuracies of training a BiLSTM model with or without LN for both DPSGD and SI-DPSGD on
the AG New Corpus. We observe the same pattern here, where SI-DPSGD clearly outperforms the
DPSGD with or without LN for all the privacy budgets.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel method for training very deep neural networks, such as ResNet
and VGG, with very strong privacy guarantees while preserving the performance of models. We
Table 6: Testing accuracy of existing differentially private training methods on AG News Corpus
with different privacy loss and δ = 10−5. SI-DPSGD results in a very stable model under very low
privacy loss (i.e  = 0.05) with close to ∼ 50% improvement in accuracy.
DP Algorithm
privacy budget (ε)
∞ 7 3 1 0.5 0.1 0.05
DPSGD (BiLSTM-DL) 88.47% 83.86% 80.00% 81.14% 77.88% 37.49% 31.78%
SI-DPSGD (BiLSTM-DL) 88.47% 85.93% 85.70% 83.29% 81.17% 77.88% 56.72%
DPSGD (LN-BiLSTM-DL) 88.18% 83.54% 82.43% 82.03% 78.87% 50.09% 31.59%
SI-DPSGD (LN-BiLSTM-DL) 88.18% 87.80% 87.58% 85.74% 85.36% 84.32% 80.10%
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demonstrated that two essential ingredients for a robust private training are 1) representing weights
as learnable distributions and 2) using normalization techniques to soften the effect of noise on the
performance. We have shown that these two factors lead to closing the gap in accuracy between
non-private baselines and private models.
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A Architecture of networks
Table 7 shows the architectures of models that we use for vision tasks.
Network Lenet-300-100 LeNet-5 ResNet-18 VGG-16 Fast-CIFAR
Convolutions
6, pool, 16, pool
64, 2x[64, 64]
2x[128, 128]
2x[256, 256]
2x[512, 512]
2x64 pool 2x128
pool, 4x256, pool
4x512, pool, 4x512
64, 128, pool
2x128, 256, pool
512, pool, 2x512, pool
FC Layers 300, 100, 10 120, 84, 10 avg-pool, 10 avg-pool, 10 10
Table 7: Architecture of deep networks that we use for vision tasks.
B Noise and rate of convergence
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the accuracy of models on the validation set, for different levels
of noise. As it is evident from these plots, models with different values of noise converge to the same
accuracy, albeit with different rates.
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Figure 1: Evolution of validation accuracy during training for MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. A
large value of noise slows down the training but does not affect the performance drastically.
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